Public Policy and Foreign Judgment Enforcement in Turkey: MÖHUK Article 54(c), Manifest Conflict and Merits Review

1. Public policy is an exceptional safety valve in foreign-judgment enforcement

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments support legal certainty in international private relations. A creditor who has already completed litigation abroad should not normally be required to relitigate the entire case in Türkiye. Article 54 therefore limits the Turkish court to specific enforcement controls rather than a full merits review.

Public policy is one of those controls. It protects the Turkish legal system from being compelled to give effect to a foreign result that conflicts fundamentally with indispensable domestic principles.

Because the exception can otherwise swallow the rule of foreign-judgment enforcement, courts must apply it narrowly.

2. Article 54(c) requires a manifest contradiction, not a debatable difference

The statutory word “manifestly” is important. The foreign result must create a clear and serious conflict with Turkish public policy. A technical inconsistency, a different legal classification or a rule unfamiliar to Turkish law is not enough.

The Turkish court should focus on the concrete effect of enforcing the foreign judgment in Türkiye. The inquiry is not whether the foreign legal system is generally similar to Turkish law.

This result-oriented approach prevents public policy from becoming disguised comparative-law criticism.

3. Public policy cannot be used to retry the foreign case

A party resisting enforcement may argue that the foreign judge misunderstood the contract, assessed witnesses incorrectly or applied the wrong foreign statute. Those are merits complaints.

Tenfiz is not an appeal from the foreign court. The Turkish judge does not decide whether the foreign court’s reasoning was persuasive; the judge determines whether the final outcome crosses the high public-policy threshold.

Where the objection requires extensive re-evaluation of evidence merely to show that the foreign court was “wrong,” it usually points toward prohibited merits review rather than genuine public-policy control.

4. A foreign judgment can be enforceable even if Turkish substantive law would produce another result

International litigation necessarily involves legal diversity. Foreign limitation periods, contract rules, damages calculations, corporate rules and evidentiary standards can differ from Turkish law.

If every such difference triggered public policy, foreign judgments would rarely be enforceable. Article 54(c) therefore does not demand substantive identity between the two legal systems.

The relevant question is whether the foreign result violates a core Turkish principle rather than merely a different non-mandatory rule.

5. Fundamental constitutional and legal values form the core of public policy

Public policy can protect basic equality, access to justice, legality, family-law safeguards, property protections and other foundational principles of the Turkish legal system.

The exact content is not frozen. Public policy is interpreted in light of current constitutional, statutory and judicial values.

For this reason, an enforcement petition or defence should identify the specific fundamental principle allegedly affected rather than use “public policy” as a label with no legal explanation.

6. Extreme procedural injustice can raise public-policy concerns

Article 54 already contains a specific defence-right condition concerning summons, representation and default judgments. Serious procedural unfairness can also intersect with public policy where the foreign process was fundamentally incompatible with the right to a fair hearing.

The two grounds should not be merged automatically. If the problem is defective service, Article 54(ç) is usually the more precise ground. If the process contains a deeper structural denial of justice, public policy can require separate analysis.

The European human-rights framework also emphasises that enforcement should not occur without an effective opportunity to raise serious unfairness complaints concerning the foreign proceedings.

7. A large foreign damages award is not automatically contrary to Turkish public policy

Foreign courts can calculate damages differently from Turkish courts. Currency, lost profits, future loss, interest and non-pecuniary compensation methods vary widely.

The size of an award alone should not determine public policy. The Turkish court should examine the nature and legal purpose of the award and whether enforcement would contradict a fundamental Turkish principle.

A commercial debtor cannot avoid enforcement simply by saying the Turkish court would probably have awarded less.

8. Punitive or exemplary components require a more careful analysis

Some legal systems award punitive or exemplary damages in addition to compensation. Turkish private law traditionally centres civil damages on compensation rather than punishment.

Where a foreign award contains a clearly punitive component, the Turkish court should analyse the nature, proportionality and effect of that component under Article 54(c). The existence of a punitive label does not eliminate the need for case-specific legal analysis.

Where the foreign judgment separates compensatory and punitive components, partial enforcement can become relevant if the statutory conditions allow the enforceable portion to be distinguished.

9. Foreign interest rules should not be confused with public policy automatically

Foreign judgments can award pre-judgment or post-judgment interest at rates calculated under the originating state’s law. A difference from Turkish statutory interest does not automatically make the judgment unenforceable.

The court should assess the legal character and total effect of the interest, together with the judgment’s enforceable terms.

If a party alleges an extreme public-policy problem, the objection should quantify the result rather than rely on a generic statement that the foreign rate is “too high.”

10. Family-status enforcement can engage especially sensitive public-policy principles

Foreign family judgments can raise public policy in matters involving children, personal status, procedural fairness and fundamental family protections.

However, the fact that the foreign family law differs from the Turkish Civil Code does not itself justify refusal. The concrete result must cross the public-policy threshold.

Foreign divorce recognition has its own procedural framework and should be distinguished from enforcement of monetary or custody-related orders.

11. Turkish immovable property also raises exclusive-jurisdiction questions

If a foreign judgment purports to decide a matter falling within exclusive Turkish jurisdiction concerning Turkish immovable property, the principal objection may arise under Article 54’s jurisdiction condition rather than public policy.

Claimants and defendants should classify the objection accurately. Using public policy where the statute provides a more specific enforcement ground weakens the analysis.

Our Article 54 refusal guide explains the full set of enforcement controls.

12. Mandatory economic rules can become relevant where the foreign result undermines fundamental Turkish regulation

Competition, sanctions, foreign-exchange, consumer or other mandatory economic rules can influence public-policy analysis where enforcement would produce a result fundamentally incompatible with Turkish law.

Not every breach of a mandatory rule automatically equals international public policy. The court should distinguish ordinary mandatory provisions from rules carrying fundamental systemic importance.

The specific Turkish statute and the foreign judgment’s practical effect should be identified.

13. Fraud should be classified carefully

Fraud in the underlying commercial facts does not automatically create a public-policy defence if it was already litigated before the foreign court. Otherwise the Turkish proceeding would become a merits retrial.

Fraud affecting the foreign judicial process itself can raise more serious concerns, particularly where the defendant had no realistic way to address it abroad.

The enforcement court should still remain within the statutory limits and examine whether the alleged fraud truly creates a fundamental enforcement problem.

14. Defence-right objections often have their own Article 54 ground

If the defendant was not properly summoned or was denied the opportunity to appear according to the law of the origin state, Article 54(ç) directly addresses the issue.

Our foreign default judgment guide explains service and defence-right objections separately.

Keeping the grounds separate improves pleading precision and avoids using public policy as a catch-all.

15. Public-policy review also matters in recognition

Article 58 uses the enforcement conditions for recognition, except reciprocity. Public policy can therefore prevent recognition of a foreign judgment as well as coercive enforcement.

The practical consequence of recognition is different: the judgment receives res judicata or conclusive-evidence effect rather than immediate execution.

Our recognition versus enforcement guide explains that distinction.

16. Public-policy arguments should be supported by the judgment and legal context

The court needs the authenticated foreign judgment and finality materials required by MÖHUK. A party invoking public policy should also provide the portions of foreign law, procedural record or judgment needed to demonstrate the alleged manifest conflict.

Abstract expert opinions that do not connect the foreign result to a concrete Turkish fundamental principle are less useful.

Certified translations should allow the Turkish court to understand the operative terms and reasoning relevant to the objection.

17. A professional Article 54(c) strategy begins by identifying the exact enforcement effect

For the creditor, the file should anticipate public-policy objections and explain why the foreign result is compatible with Turkish fundamental principles even if the governing foreign law differs.

For the debtor, the defence should identify a specific manifest conflict and avoid merely rearguing the foreign merits.

Bakırcı & Keskin Hukuk Bürosu has physical offices in Istanbul and Mersin. Foreign-judgment recognition and enforcement matters throughout Türkiye can be coordinated from these offices subject to the competent court and procedural rules.

Conclusion

Turkish public policy is a narrow enforcement control, not a second merits appeal. Article 54(c) requires a manifest contradiction with fundamental Turkish legal principles. Differences in foreign law, damages or procedure are not enough by themselves. The strongest enforcement or defence strategy classifies the exact objection, separates public policy from service, reciprocity and jurisdiction grounds, and focuses on the concrete effect of giving the foreign judgment legal force in Türkiye.